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It will be particularly useful to those seeking to promote enhanced privacy for their patrons. The obtained results confirm the viability of such a messaging service.Ī Guide to Using the Anonymous Web in Libraries and Information Organizations provides practical guidance to those who are interested in integrating the anonymous web into their services.

Moreover, a proof-of-concept of the proposed message service is implemented and tested using two online services acting as proxies in the exchange of encrypted information disguised within images and links to those images. This work reviews the viability of using existing online services to support the proposed messaging service. In the proposed messaging service, only the sender and the receiver are aware of the existence of the exchanged data, even if the online services used or other third parties have access to the exchanged secret data containers. In this paper, we propose messaging using steganography and online services to support anonymous and confidential communication. Online services can still be used to support this messaging service, but in a way that enables users to communicate anonymously and without the knowledge and scrutiny of the online services. Thus, a gap still exists for alternative messaging services that enable anonymous and confidential communication and that are independent of a specific online service. This information allows the identification of users and is available to the messaging service provider even when communication is encrypted end-to-end. Messaging services are usually provided within social network platforms and allow these platforms to collect additional information about users, such as what time, for how long, with whom, and where a user communicates.

Finally, we propose strategies to detect poisoned responses that can (1) sanitize poisoned DNS records from the cache of public DNS resolvers, and (2) assist in the development of circumvention tools to bypass the GFW's DNS censorship. We found 77K censored domains with DNS resource records polluted in popular public DNS resolvers, such as Google and Cloudflare. Using data from GFWatch, we studied the impact of GFW blocking on the global DNS system. We also observe bogus IPv6 and globally routable IPv4 addresses injected by the GFW, including addresses owned by US companies, such as Facebook, Dropbox, and Twitter. We further reverse engineer regular expressions used by the GFW and find 41K innocuous domains that match these filters, resulting in overblocking of their content. To the best of our knowledge, this is the largest number of domains tested and censored domains discovered in the literature. We present the results of running GFWatch over a nine-month period, during which we tested an average of 411M domains per day and detected a total of 311K domains censored by GFW's DNS filter. In this study, we introduce GFWatch, a large-scale, longitudinal measurement platform capable of testing hundreds of millions of domains daily, enabling continuous monitoring of the GFW's DNS filtering behavior. However, most prior studies of China's DNS filtering were performed over short time periods, leading to unnoticed changes in the GFW's behavior. The DNS filtering apparatus of China's Great Firewall (GFW) has evolved considerably over the past two decades.